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Imperial liberalism and institution building at the end of empire in Africa[1]

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There can be few better illustrations of the reach of Western liberalism, as well as its contradictions and limitations, than developments associated with the end of the European colonial empires, including in Africa. They provide a powerful illustration of the extent to which in the twentieth century liberalism had become the dominant Western political ideology, transformed, in Duncan Bell's words, from a 'limited and contested position within political discourse' into 'the most authentic expression of the Western tradition or a constitutive feature of the West itself'.[2] Once European colonial powers were forced to retreat they aimed to transfer power to successor states fashioned along the lines of Western parliamentary systems that in the British case would take their place in the Commonwealth and help ensure, in the Cold War context, the preservation of British influence.[3] The wheel had come full circle: whereas in the nineteenth century liberalism once hostile to imperialism had become complicit in the imposition of colonialism,[4] so, in the twentieth, ideas of politically liberal systems underpinned efforts to transition back from 'formal' to 'informal' empire.[5] While managing this transition entailed the exercise of decidedly illiberal authoritarian powers, the British nonetheless sought to present decolonisation as the culmination of a liberal imperialism. In 1947 they even commissioned the historian Sir Reginald Coupland to produce a short historical account of the liberal nature of British imperialism to show that Indian independence represented the fulfilment of the liberal, civilising mission 'desired more than a century ago'.[6] For their part, colonial elites bought into and instrumentalised these liberal discourses to advance their own objectives.[7] They demanded independence within states and structures modelled along Western democratic lines, reflecting the ascendancy of discourses of self-determination and Western liberalism. This is despite the fact that as Emma Hunter has recently reminded us, alternative, conservative, forms of nationalism associated with chieftaincy had greater contemporary hold than historians, inclined to view nationalist politics through the lens of mid-twentieth-century liberalism, have sufficiently acknowledged.[8]

This article engages with the theme of liberalism through analysis of British ideas about institution-building below the level of parliamentary democracies in Anglophone African states at the end of empire. Processes of institution-building and transfer (through 'localisation' and the appointment of Africans to senior positions) and the successful creation of parastatal institutions were intimately related to the Westminster model. Sound institutions below the level of parliaments were crucial underpinning to the successful working of the Westminster system, and their political neutrality a fundamental aspect of Western, politically liberal systems (understood here as those in which executive power is balanced by that of the legislature and judiciary; the civil rights of individuals are protected by law; and in which institutions in civil society, such as the press, can operate free from state control).[9] Processes of institution-building have largely been discussed through the prism of development, including by scholars attentive to the striking parallels between discourses of 'good government' prominent during decolonisation and those associated with late twentieth and early twenty-first century humanitarian and neo-liberal interventions overseas.[10] There has been comparatively less attention to the ways in which institution-building served as a site for the articulation of political (as well as economic) liberalism.[11]

This article explores the views of academics on the development of higher education and public administration in emergent states, and of bankers in relation to the creation of new central banks in former colonies. It does not attempt to offer anything approaching a

comprehensive survey of institution-building in these sectors. Moreover, while we focus here on British ideas, we should be clear that the reforming dynamic rested at least as much with African actors as with British, who throughout the colonial period had demanded the development of educational and other institutions, and the advancement of Africans within them, from colonial authorities that had resisted such calls, whether from self-interest or cultural and racial prejudice.[12] Even in a new climate of modernising development from the 1940s, as the British engaged in new processes of institution building they were generally still pushed into action by African, and sometimes international, pressure. A full discussion of the theme of institution building would also need to take in examples from other sectors, most obviously, legal. However, it is hoped that a focus on the quite different examples of higher education, administration and banking will serve to reinforce the case being made in this article about the pervasive influence of political liberalism on institution-building at the end of empire. It argues that, however instrumentally deployed, an imperial liberalism had an energising effect on some Britons within domestic institutions whose expertise was called upon to assist with the development of successor institutions in emergent states. Further, as these individuals engaged in a process of institution-building, they acted in ways that were not only determined by Western liberalism, but also by distinctively British ideas of state power. Nevertheless, while their approaches undoubtedly derived from deep rooted convictions about the kind of institutions that were essential to the operation of politically liberal systems, such considerations were in tension with more self-interested concerns which could compromise efforts to replicate British institutions.

Anglophone Africa offers rich scope for an exploration of this theme. In the transition to self-government even less progress had been made with institution building and localisation in Britain's African colonies than, for example, had been the case in South Asia. Not only did the movement to independence within a short period of time of so many colonies entail institution-building on an almost industrial scale, but this provided significant opportunity for Britons based in domestic institutions to deploy their expertise in the task. We should nevertheless be cautious about identifying any African particularity. One obvious reason for this is that the ideas and initiatives relating to institution-building discussed here principally through African examples were developed with reference to the dependent British empire in general. In some sectors, for example banking, British advisers also perceived their role as comparable to that they had earlier played in relation to the 'old' Commonwealth or - like Eric Ashby, an adviser on the establishment of African universities - consciously situated their activities in the longer history of the 'export' of British institutions that encompassed both settler colonies and India.[13] Equally pertinent, the circumstances in which institutions were developed or transferred varied across the continent according to local politics and were the product of distinct territorially-based processes of negotiation and implementation. Moreover, since a process of institution-building mostly accompanied or followed some element of self-government and was shaped by local elites (even though generally in contexts in which the British retained considerable influence), the sort of distinction drawn by several scholars (with reference to the Westminster system in Asia) between 'transplanted' institutions in settler states and those 'implanted' in non-settler states is too rigid to be fully applicable in the case of African countries. [14] In British eyes a variety of factors also applied according to African states varying degrees of strategic and economic importance. But, perhaps less obvious, were distinctions of time. From our contemporary perspective it is easy to collapse the decolonisation of British African colonies into one short phase commencing with Ghanaian independence in 1957 and concluding (with the notable exception of Rhodesia, as well as the southern African high commission territories) in 1965 with that of the Gambia. But even as new institutions were being fashioned in some locations, others were

being modified in those states that had already attained independence, influencing later British approaches.

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A process of institution building began before but more frequently (especially in East and Central Africa) occurred at or after constitutional independence. But its origins can be dated to a series of shifts that occurred in British policy in response to developments in the late 1930s and in the first years of the Second World War. In the 1940s doctrines of 'trusteeship' and 'indirect rule' that had underpinned British approaches to administering Africa in the first half of the twentieth century were discarded in favour of new concepts of 'partnership' and 'development'. Rather than (as it had in the earlier twentieth century) seeking to preserve what the British identified as traditional African political institutions, British policy now aimed at the transformation of the colonies along British lines. The reasons behind this shift are well known and need not detain us long here: suffice to say that even before the war, problems with a system of colonial African governance based (theoretically) on hereditary claims to rule rather than meritocratic ones, and which vested authority in traditional rather than 'new', Western-educated, elites, were becoming apparent especially in increasingly urban societies. From 1947 British local government policy in Africa was reformed as a first step towards the development of fully-fledged parliamentary systems in Britain's colonies, although in practice the pace of political change in West Africa at least would mean that developments at the centre would soon after outstrip those at local governmental level.[15] Dismantling a system of 'native administration' based around the preservation of traditional African institutions and authorities that posited separate developmental routes had implications for other aspects of British colonial policy. For example, hitherto one objection to the appointment of Africans to senior positions in public administration had been that they would be unable to work effectively with the African chiefs and their advisers, in whom Britain had vested authority. This had led the British to resist the development of African higher education, demanded by African elites, in part because it was suspected that without jobs to enter (notably, in public administration) the creation of 'new' elites would ultimately foster colonial frustration and political instability. Upholding traditional systems had hence become one justification for Britain's failure to do more in relation to the expansion of higher education within Britain's African colonies.[16]

Even before the African local government reforms, the Colonial Office was already revising other aspects of colonial policy relating to development and welfare in response to widespread unrest in British colonies in the late 1930s and past policy failures, and to present British rule in a more progressive and constructive light. 'Partnership' and 'development' had become new ways of legitimising colonialism in the face of a variety of hostile forces and were very consciously used to promote an acceptable face of colonialism to audiences at home, within the empire, and internationally.[17] In summer 1943 the secretary of state for the colonies, Oliver Stanley, declared that the long-term objective of British policy was the gradual advancement of British colonies 'along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire'.[18] Paradoxically the actual process of creating liberal societies on British lines necessitated greater rather than less state intervention and Stanley's articulation of a new imperial mission was accompanied by other initiatives relating to colonial development, notably, as discussed below, in respect of colonial higher education.

Conservatism, however, still characterised, and in some cases, compromised, British initiatives.

This imperial liberalism was also all too frequently accompanied by the exercise of illiberal powers.[19] Even as in London officials were advocating partnership and development, in wartime South Asia some 11,700 were imprisoned, including the most senior officials of the Indian National Congress, following the enactment of emergency legislation on the outbreak of war.[20] Whatever the British justification for such moves in terms of war and the defence of the Western liberal order, the enactment of emergency powers was illustrative of fundamental tensions in British political liberalism. Indeed as Terence Halliday and Lucien Karpik argue, while the British authorities had always insisted on the universality of the rule of law (a fundamental aspect of politically-liberal systems), this was compromised in colonial contexts by a rule of difference with parallel legal systems (in Africa, 'native courts'), and also, and most critically, by reserving the right to exercise power by sovereign decree and to declare states of emergency that abrogated normal law and gave the state unfettered coercive powers.[21] After the Second World War states of emergency were commonly used as the British sought to regain control in the face of insurgency or political disorder, most notably and for the greatest duration in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya.[22] In this way rule by decree and the suspension of normal law was as much part of the political-legal inheritance of former British colonies on independence as liberal legal systems, with significant consequences for the colonies' post-colonial trajectory.[23]

However, to arrive at a richly-textured understanding of British decolonisation we need to incorporate a wide variety of dynamics, such as how ideas of the distinctively liberal identity of the British state and its relations with civil society helped shape the policies and responses of a range of British actors and institutions to the decolonisation process. As Emma Hunter observes, 'International thought was not characterised only by the assumption that the international political order would and should be based on nation-states and not empires. It was also characterised by a set of assumptions about what kind of political society should be contained within the building blocks of nations, defined in terms of parliamentary democracy, representative government and individual rights'. [24] In British eyes this required the relative autonomy of institutions from the state and from political interference, and the development of an African, professional, middle class to fill posts within them. [25]

These are features of any liberal political system, with the political neutrality of the judiciary or the army essential checks on the raw political authority of states. None the less, these features had assumed a distinct form within the British system. Patrick Joyce suggests that the British state was liberal not simply because it enshrined principles of political liberty, but because it also allowed designated bodies to operate comparatively independently.[26] We can see this in relation to British universities. In contrast to an American private model, British universities at the time were public institutions, but they had greater freedom from state control than public universities in most other European countries, where, Robert Anderson notes, the Napoleonic era left its 'stamp'. This is most obvious within the centralised and bureaucratic system of France but is evident too in the case of the older German universities whose financial independence was damaged by the effects of French conquest and occupation. Even though in the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the British state extended greater control over universities (for example as a result of the inauguration of student grants after the First World War), British universities still retained considerable autonomy.[27] Within British political culture a consensus had emerged about the desirability of limiting state control derived in part from the cultural capital of institutions like Britain's oldest universities, not least because those appointed to positions within the state had themselves generally been educated within them and bought into the same values.

As Anderson further argues with reference to interwar Britain, 'politicians and bureaucrats belonged to a political culture which was suspicious of the power of the state, and really did believe that the independence of universities was an important liberal value, a tradition to be cherished, and that they worked best when left to determine their own policies'.[28]

As they turned to the development of institutions in emergent states, those involved drew on the British examples they not only knew best but that they also deemed best practice. In so doing they incorporated their own distinctively British ideas about the independence of institutions from the state. Some of the views expressed by British actors in institutions on the borders of the state relating to African institutional development need to be understood as also interventions in debates about the nature of the *domestic* state at a time at which -- for all individuals' and institutions' views on the nature of a politically liberal state -- saw the emergence of new ideas about the state's place in the economy and society which challenged established assumptions about universities, the civil service, and about central banking. However, what might be thought of as disinterested concern with best practice - albeit that this was in itself a manifestation of an imperialism of knowledge derived from a presumption that the British knew best - was inextricably bound up with a set of other more selfish objectives. In their most benign form these aims embodied a vested interest in good governance, vital to the stability of new states within the Commonwealth and more broadly to Western interests in the Cold War. Engagement with institution-building overseas was crucial also to the British state's claims to be a source of modernising development along Western, liberal lines, and, through the dissemination of British models and Britishness, to the broader objective of securing influence at the end of empire.[29] But, whether consciously or unconsciously individuals based in British institutions also acted in ways that advanced their own narrower interests, even if they might also have conceived these as compatible with the best interests of emergent states.

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British universities and academics were one obvious source of mid twentieth-century liberal ideas.[30] Many academics had been brought into advisory roles in relation to colonial policy both before the war and during it, exemplifying the state's growing recourse to 'experts' in the formulation and delivery of policy. They served on the committees and other specialist bodies that proliferated in the period and as advisers to the Colonial Office across a range of social and natural sciences.[31] Some of these academics were instrumental in the development of new policy initiatives in relation to colonial institution-building, including, as discussed, higher education and administration, and were energised by the state's articulation of a new liberal civilising mission. H.J. Channon, a professor of biochemistry at the University of Liverpool, and one of the most active members of the Colonial Office's education advisory committee, pressed on the Colonial Office in 1941 the importance of developing colonial universities as a crucial step towards enabling colonial peoples to 'stand on their own feet'. [32] At this date there were few universities anywhere in the colonial Empire and none in Britain's African colonies, although there were several higher education institutions.[33] Margery Perham, reader in colonial administration at the University of Oxford argued that British universities now had a 'more important task than any handled by the Colonial Office itself' in 'the training of their [the emergent nations'] leaders and experts so that they may take back from us the control of their own affairs'.[34]

Channon and Perham both became central figures in metropolitan discussions around colonial universities. In 1943 Channon's intervention contributed to the Colonial Office's

decision to appoint a commission chaired by Lord Justice Asquith to investigate higher education in the colonies; [35] as Tim Livsey has recently shown, developments in Africa also played a decisive role in the origins and shape of new initiatives relating to colonial universities.[36] Channon and Perham were both appointed to the new Commission, while Channon was also a member of a separate regional commission convened a few weeks earlier to give consideration to higher education in West Africa (the 'Elliot Commission').[37] When it reported in June 1945, the Asquith Commission recommended the formation of universities in the colonies and set out proposals to assist with the drafting of their founding constitutions. These recommendations remained the model for colonial universities until the late 1950s when there began to be greater reference to American experience as well as to the local conditions.[38] The Commission also proposed the creation of a new Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies (later Overseas) comprising members drawn from British and colonial universities to assist with these tasks.[39] A series of new university institutions followed. Via the secondment of academics to new colonial university colleges to facilitate their conversion to full university status, the creation of the IUC initiated a new and extended phase of British academic engagement with educational institutions in emergent states that Commission members hoped might generate close ties that would survive the colonies' transition to independence.[40] Margery Perham became one of the IUC's most longstanding and key members. Another was Ivor Jennings, initially as a representative of the University of Ceylon, and, from 1948 to 1961 co-opted to the Council.[41] Jennings' career straddled the worlds of democracy-building on the Westminster model and of sub-parliamentary institution building. He was the founding Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ceylon, as well as later Master of Trinity Hall in the University of Cambridge and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge from 1961 to 1963. He was also the foremost Commonwealth constitutional expert of the day and had advised on the Ceylon constitution as well as on constitutional issues in India, Pakistan, Malaya and Nepal.[42]

Of course, there was a complexity and diversity of views within Britain and within single institutions. For example, some, like Perham were excited by the prospect of assisting the colonies to eventual self-government, whereas others remained more committed to upholding empire. Equally, even among those who were most committed to empire within the universities, there were some who doubted the universities' capacity to participate in a latter-day civilising mission in this instance by making their academic staff available for secondment to new colonial institutions. Sir Douglas Veale, as the university's registrar the most senior administrative figure at the University of Oxford, and a committed 'empire man', reminded his long-term ally and director of colonial service recruitment at the Colonial Office, Sir Ralph Furse, in May 1943 in connection to proposals for the 'loan' of university staff for the service of empire, that 'the supply [of British academics] in fact is limited'. He feared, moreover, that 'not every eminent scholar' was 'suitable for this kind of missionary work'. It was no use, he warned, 'sending someone who suffers from ochlophobia', or who 'is exceedingly ill-mannered, or enjoys poor health', or even, he added, 'a disagreeable wife who insists on going with him'.[43]

As they engaged with the task of developing colonial universities, however, British academics agreed on the importance of replicating overseas the principle of academic freedom and university autonomy alongside other features of the British university system.[44] It was essential, the Asquith Commission noted, that the new institutions 'should have full freedom to manage their own affairs'. [45] According to Perham, reflecting retrospectively on the deliberations of the Asquith Commission, ensuring 'a form of university government which enshrined the academic freedom which we had developed in this country' had been one of two overriding principles that had guided the deliberations of the Commission,

alongside the maintenance of standards by ensuring that admission to colonial universities was governed by the same high entry criteria as at home in Britain. Writing in the early postcolonial era, in the light of the transition away from these principles among some African universities, Perham wondered retrospectively if the Commission had been wrong. She concluded that 'we could give only what we knew & valued'. [46] As Tim Livsey argues in a discussion of the development of universities in Nigeria, British university freedom was relative rather than absolute, as was that of the new University of Ibadan in the late colonial era from the British authorities.[47] To an extent the Asquith recommendations had acknowledged the inevitability of this. 'Colonial universities', the Commission had proposed, 'should be autonomous in the sense in which the universities of Great Britain are autonomous'. Autonomy should not preclude a degree of public accountability nor some role for governments, including via the exercise of supervisory functions compatible with the award of state funding. Nevertheless, through appropriate checks and balances including a Senate which would be a purely academic body, as well as the judicious division of seats so that no external organisation could exercise a majority in a university's governing council, the Commission believed that academic freedom would prevail. [48] British academics had also secured for the IUC relative autonomy from the Colonial Office (which devolved to it considerable authority to act in relation to the development of colonial universities).[49] But Livsey's comments point to the distortions that could follow from the importation of British models into colonial contexts. There was one set of constraints which British academics would probably not initially have recognised, although Eric Ashby later acknowledged the tensions between academic freedom and the British role: the 'academic freedom' of new universities would be mediated by the supervision of British academics, for example via the inclusion of one or two representatives of the IUC on the governing councils of new universities and via special arrangements linking new universities to the University of London designed to ensure the maintenance of academic standards.[50] This wholesale adherence to British traditions and oversight by advisers who sought to instil their ideas of best practice was initially accepted, and even embraced, by elites in emergent states committed to the development of universities that should not in any way be regarded as 'second rate'. However, not only would the inbuilt safeguards prove no guarantee against future state interference, but the institutions' British complexion ensured that a subsequent decolonising phase would later follow, as independent states sought curricula and facilities better equipped to meet the needs of developing states.[51]

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If we now turn from the development of higher education to that of public administration, we can see that the same understanding of the appropriate relationship of institutions to the state informed another aspect of the older universities' involvement with institution-building at the end of empire: training a first generation of overseas public servants to succeed British colonial officials within the public services of new states who should be free to act without political interference. Within the British system the traditions of public service (established in the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan reforms, which recommended the creation of a permanent unified civil service recruited by competitive examination) included open entry by means of academic competition to positions within a service organised into grades according to function; a system of promotion based on merit and seniority; and adherence to a principle of political neutrality that meant officials retained their posts irrespective of their party political allegiances.[52] In practice, colonial public services had deviated from the British model in several important respects: they were organised on racial rather than meritocratic lines, and they did not realise the ideals of bureaucratic

neutrality,[53] not least because until the advent of African self-government within Britain's African colonies British public servants exercised executive authority.

None the less while the Colonial Service differed from British public service traditions in this manner, we can again see ways in which British practice was distinct from continental European. Specifically, since 1926 new entrants to the Colonial Service had completed a training course at Oxford or Cambridge before taking up posts overseas in the service of individual colonies, rather than as in France or Belgium undergoing an initial training at dedicated colonial staff colleges.[54] In British eyes this less centralised system, in which responsibility for training was devolved by the imperial state to the universities, was preferable to the staff college model and crucial in the development of civil servants in the British tradition. As academics and administrators at Oxford and Cambridge argued in the early 1940s on the occasion of a major review of Colonial Service training,[55] this was best done via a broad university-based post-graduate course, one that privileged the academic rather than the practical, and the generalist rather than the specialist.[56] After the war the state sought to admit to these courses high-flying non-European students, especially Africans, who were initially destined for posts in the Colonial Service and later within bureaucracies in independent countries. In the 1950s British officials thought that studying at Oxbridge would be the best means of acculturating overseas civil servants to the values of a liberal education by broadening their outlook and horizons, and so shaping African middle-class entrants to administration along the lines of the generalists of the British civil service. [57] A nascent African administrative middle class was also perceived by some as vital not just to preventing administrative collapse in emergent states but to ensuring a pro-Western outlook.[58]

As overseas administrators were admitted to these courses, initially in only small numbers, but by the early 1960s comprising the majority of those enrolled on them, key figures involved in their delivery argued for the continuation of a form of administrative training at Oxbridge. Via tuition in a wide range of subjects as part of a liberal education, overseas students would be equipped with the skills necessary to act as key mediators between politicians and experts in ways that would help maintain the autonomy of civil servants from governments. By this date the manpower needs of new African states were considerable and urgent, and the priority for overseas governments was naturally the development of local training in public administration. The British acknowledged as much in a major review of British assistance in the training of overseas public administrators by a committee established under the chairmanship of Lord Bridges, former head of the home civil service.[59] Britain as well as other foreign countries and international organisations became one source of assistance in the development of new training institutes located in former colonies. A huge diaspora of British officials also remained in post in many former colonies or were seconded to new positions within the public services of new states under the auspices of the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, introduced in 1961 amidst fears that unless Britain did more to facilitate the continuation in post of British personnel there was a real danger of administrative collapse at least in East Africa.[60] But Oxford academics successfully defended the case for the continuation of some form of training for an elite few overseas administrators at Oxbridge, arguing in their evidence submitted to the Bridges committee that,

> 'An indigenous civil service cannot just have handed on to it, ready-made, high standards of impartiality, reliability, incorruptibility and so on; it must establish them afresh for itself. For this its officers need to learn how to read and to think; how to present a case and debate it; how to weigh conflicting arguments and reach a decision; how to apply that decision with realism and moderation; and how to recognise and use the lessons of experience. … nowhere can this be done better than

> in the older universities such as Oxford which, in effect, say to such students: 'We cannot give you the answers to your future problems; but we can help you to acquire for yourselves the equipment with which you can usefully tackle them. [61]

Through lectures on governance and British history overseas students were taught key aspects of British political culture, including the ways in which authority within the British system rested with institutions which had gradually evolved. The *gradual* evolution of British institutions of government might serve, as the Oxford course supervisor put it, as the perfect antidote to 'impatient and perfectionist political ambitions'.[62] Sir Ivor Jennings was among those lecturing to these administrative cadets at Cambridge in the 1950s; another means of educating students from a variety of African and other Commonwealth states in a British parliamentary and liberal tradition, which Jennings had already been instrumental in implanting in an Asian context.[63] In the 1950s, conscious of the burdens that delivering one-year courses imposed on the university, the authorities at Oxford debated whether they should continue to participate in administrative training. On balance they reflected that such courses represented an investment in the 'people in whose hands lay the future of large areas of the Commonwealth'.[64] Simultaneously at the request of several governments Oxford became involved from the 1950s in delivering bespoke courses for new diplomats within the new foreign services of Commonwealth states, which eventually developed into the University's Foreign Service Programme.

Nevertheless, such apparently disinterested statements of service and commitment to the emergent Commonwealth resided alongside individual and institutional self-interest. As Véronique Dimier argues, in the early and mid-twentieth century the association with the imperial services was a source of prestige for Oxford and Cambridge, and, until it was brought into the new post-war Devonshire training scheme, a source of resentment in London at the University of London's exclusion from this role.[65] There were material interests at stake too. For example, the universities received a stipend from first the Colonial Office, and later the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Ministry of Overseas Development, to deliver the colonial administrative service training and successor courses, generating income and funds to support academic specialisms. More abstractly, as academics and civil servants articulated a case in defence of the generalist tradition for the training, first, of Britain's colonial officials, and subsequently, overseas public administrators, it seems likely that they were – consciously or unconsciously - intervening in contemporary discussions about the nature of the home civil service as the value of the generalist-amateur tradition and emphasis on 'character' increasingly came under attack in the light also of persistent worries about elitism in a system in which Oxbridge graduates were over represented. The British generalist tradition was increasingly in tension with a growing reliance on specialist knowledge, as well as a Keynesian approach to economic planning.[66] In one of the most significant critiques Thomas Balogh expressly linked the home and overseas services, in arguing that a cultivation of 'powers of dialectical argument only' had had 'devastating effects' including in British colonies which lacked expertise in economic planning.[67] In the 1960s growing criticism led to the appointment of the Fulton Committee on the civil service.[68]

British discussions about training overseas public administrators hence occurred against a backdrop in which views of what constituted best practice were changing. Both Oxford and Cambridge continued to offer a form of the administrative training course, but the generalist tradition was increasingly a handicap as Whitehall officials began expressing greater preference for vocational training. State funding for the courses was finally withdrawn from Oxford in 1969, while the Cambridge course, reconfigured in the 1970s as a

course on development, survived until 1981.[69] Africans who subsequently rose to the most senior positions within their own civil services were among course graduates. But even where they apparently subscribed to British administrative ideals, they might fall foul of governments hostile to a colonial inheritance and traditions of political neutrality.[70]

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If the universities are an obvious place in which to locate the impact of imperial liberalism, it also registered in some less likely quarters. In summer 1943 a month after Oliver Stanley identified advancement towards self-government as the aim of British colonial policy, Montagu Norman, longstanding governor of the Bank of England, complaining to Stanley about Colonial Office proposals made in relation to colonial currency boards, turned Stanley's recent liberal rhetoric against him. 'I am especially disappointed', Norman wrote in response to Stanley's refusal to accept one of his proposals, 'because what I suggested seemed to me at best a step in the direction of democracy; and it is surprising to me to find such a step refused when you in particular are beating the democratic drum in the colonies'.[71] In question was whether there should be representatives with local business and financial knowledge on the London-based regional boards which issued and managed colonial currencies; Norman believed there should. Raymond Kershaw, an Australian economist, and since 1935 an adviser to the Bank's governors, deplored what he perceived as a Colonial Office tendency to 'neglect the view of local interest in the interests of alleged centralised efficiency'. In contrast the Colonial Office worried about the politics of selecting local representatives and feared also that this might entail the appointment of a 'native', at least in West Africa.[72] There was an ambiguity to Norman's words: whereas the Colonial Office saw the appointment of representatives of 'local' interests on the currency boards as likely to lead to the inclusion of African members, there is no evidence that Norman necessarily understood 'local' as anything other than the co-option of Britons engaged in business in the colonies. For our purposes what is most relevant here is what Norman's intervention reveals of his own understanding of the appropriate relationship of institutions to the state. As Norman had argued in correspondence a few weeks before with Sir George Gater, the permanent under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, what the Colonial Office proposed seemed to 'foreshadow a condition in which there will be all State and no citizens, and certainly no citizens having a responsible share in the operations of the State'.[73] In private Norman condemned the move as 'undemocratic – worthy of Nazi – although the Col. [sic] Office is waving the flag of democracy in most countries'.[74] Just as would later be the case with discussions over the generalist tradition and the public services, Norman's perspective was surely shaped by his own recent domestic experience of the gradual subordination of the Bank's control over monetary policy to the Treasury as ideas about the desirability of central bank autonomy shifted as a result of a Keynsian emphasis on the role of the state in economic management.

After the Second World War, this view of the importance of the independence of institutions from the state was reflected in the Bank's approach towards the establishment of new central banking institutions in Britain's colonies and former colonies. The Bank of England, like the universities, became involved in the provision of forms of technical assistance to new states, albeit in this instance as a result of its own initiative rather than under the auspices of any government department. Existing accounts of the Bank during decolonisation emphasise its resistance to developing new currencies and central banks, and focus on its priority of promoting the sterling area and sterling's role as an international trading and reserve currency.[75] But once in the mid-1950s it became obvious that the Bank

could no longer profitably resist the development of institutions demanded by colonial politicians, as well as increasingly advocated by the World Bank,[76] the Bank sought to exercise as much oversight as possible over the creation of new financial institutions in emergent states. The Bank provided advisers who drafted founding statutes for some of the new African central banks, as well as seconding its own staff to fill senior positions in them, and also inaugurated a short training course for Commonwealth central bankers in London.[77] In these various activities what we might rightly see as a form of financial imperialism also resided alongside a more abstract and cultural understanding of what 'good banking' meant in the context of a British liberal tradition.

In 1946 the Bank of England had itself been nationalised.[78] But notwithstanding its change in status, Bank officials nevertheless remained committed to the principle of central bank autonomy and -- just as with the universities and the civil service -- distinct understandings of the state and its relation to civil society shaped the Bank of England's approach to its role in emergent states at the end of empire. A fundamental principle guiding the actions of their senior personnel as they advised on the statutes for which new central banks were based was that new banks should be as independent as possible of their governments.[79] Statutes for new banks in West and Central Africa drafted by Bank of England advisers therefore gave no powers to governments to direct the banks' affairs.[80] In East Africa, where the Bank was unable to exercise the same level of oversight over the development of new central banks as it had in West Africa, officials nevertheless also sought where they could to promote this model of central banking.[81]

In this respect the Bank's views increasingly collided with those of other international experts and reflect specific British approaches. After the war American experts attached to the Federal Reserve, who had previously cleaved to the same liberal financial orthodoxy as those at the Bank of England, prioritising external currency stability, now adopted an alternative approach, seeking to strengthen the capacity of national governments to pursue policies geared towards domestic monetary goals.[82] The American approach was premised on the idea that central banks could serve as engines of economic development in new states, including through their ability to advance money to their governments. The British on the other hand feared that if new governments had control over the banks they would raid them for funds to pay for expensive development projects, thereby fuelling inflation and damaging the prestige and stability of their currencies.[83] This had happened in the case of the Bank of Ceylon after the Ceylonese government turned to American experts to advise on the formation of their central bank as they sought to free themselves from what they saw (in many ways rightly) as the imperialism of the Bank of England. Opened in 1950, the Bank of Ceylon followed American models, and quickly became a source of credit to the government.[84] Similar concerns lay behind the Bank of England's preference to secure a separation of commercial and central banking functions; this also differed from American approaches since the latter anticipated that to facilitate economic development new banks in developing economies might have to be prepared to engage in direct lending. [85]

As English bankers engaged with questions of financial devolution within the emergent Commonwealth this adherence to what they perceived as 'best practice' co-existed with a set of more self-interested motives. As Peter Cain and A.G. Hopkins argue in relation to the interwar years, when the Bank had also been engaged in the development of new central banks, in this case in the dominions, India, and South America, central banks formed on an English model and permitted to function free from state interference were more likely to accept guidance from the Bank of England.[86] Most significantly, in the 1950s and early 1960s the Bank attached overriding importance to upholding sterling as a reserve currency and the mechanisms of the sterling area (to which African members were of increasing

importance as older Commonwealth states began to draw down their sterling holdings).[87] Central banks under the control of independent African governments, elected to office amidst hopes that they would deliver ambitious development plans, were more likely to turn to sterling reserves to fund development schemes as well as to diversify their holdings away from sterling.

But rather than rely on such mechanisms Bank of England officials resorted to more direct ways of protecting the Bank's interests. For example, in drawing up the statutes of the new central banks of Ghana and Nigeria, the Bank of England's John Loynes built in a requirement that the banks keep a majority of their reserves in sterling, British government securities or gold held in London.[88] In the Ghanaian case he even specified a fixed maximum fiduciary issue (that is, the limit to the issue of currency not backed by reserves) that could only be changed by the country's new parliament. In this and other ways he hoped to have created a bank that was not 'too dangerous'.[89] It seems likely that Loynes understood 'dangerous' not just in terms of a potential threat to British interests, but also in relation to the possible risks to the stability of Ghana's currency, and, by extension, to its ability to attract foreign investment that a departure from conservative approaches to monetary policy might entail. Even so, while the British sought to enshrine central bank independence from successor governments, they simultaneously sought to ensure the protection of British interests in ways that compromised the ability of the new banks to operate in an autonomous fashion and which were likely to generate tensions between the new banks and postcolonial African governments.

These more selfish objectives go a long way towards explaining the importance the Bank also attached to training a new class of Commonwealth central bankers and its willingness to second staff to fill posts in new banks. [90] By working with, and providing tuition to, Commonwealth bankers, it hoped to embed some attachment to sterling and the sterling area. But, in this instance too, these objectives are difficult to disentangle from a political liberal agenda. For via their training activities, Bank officials hoped to cultivate a class of African professional bankers who might take their place in international banking networks and contribute to the development of Western politically liberal systems. As one British banker seconded to work in Nigeria's new central bank observed, in relation to his Nigerian colleagues, 'once the middle class becomes sufficiently distinct to exercise an effect on public opinion and politics' it would help secure the country's future. [91] The Bank's Commonwealth course proved perhaps surprisingly durable, not least because of sustained demand from bankers in new states eager to make use of all training opportunities available to them. This was the case despite the fact that there was some suspicion of the Bank of England and British influence, particularly among their governments that in some instances encouraged a departure from the banking model British bankers were so keen to implant.

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For a short period, then, as they engaged in an alternative form of constitution writing, drafting statutes and legal instruments for new institutions in Commonwealth African states, individuals acted in ways that reflected the traction that the liberal imperial idea had within sectors of British society. Although we need to see beyond individuals' sometimes self-justificatory and aggrandising claims about their commitment to, or role in, institutional development, liberalism was not simply a rhetorical device used to advance imperial objectives; rather it was also a conception of the British tradition that had been taught to individual Britons and which shaped their actions. In the eyes of Britons based in domestic

institutions located on or beyond the borders of the state politically liberal systems entailed the construction of similar parastatal institutions similarly located, but not subordinated to, executive power. They perceived these as crucial accessories to the successful transfer of the Westminster model. These understandings of the appropriate relationship of institutions to the state reflected not just a broad Western liberal tradition but distinctive British ideas of the liberal state.

It quickly became apparent, however, that the British legacy fell short of these ambitions. A failure to institute processes of institutional development and transfer sufficiently early in Africa created states that were not properly institutionalised. [92] Even where some scholars judge British values had successfully been transferred in relation to institutions in different sectors, they conclude that the societies and cultures and the different circumstances in which different countries attained independence were crucial in determining the survival or otherwise of British values.[93] Furthermore, institutions that the British had conceived as crucial cogs in politically liberal states fell prey to political interference rather than serving as bulwarks against a transition away from a Westminster model. In the first of Britain's African colonies to attain independence, Ghana, the country's leader Kwame Nkrumah had instituted a one-party state and subordinated key institutions to it even as similar institutions were being constructed elsewhere in colonial Africa. Having first sought to circumvent the civil service by creating posts outside it (including a series of 'district commissioners' who would act as ministerial personal assistants), in 1960 he proceeded to change the public service commission as it had been established at independence. The following year he formed a branch of his party, the Convention People's Party in the Establishment Secretariat.[94] Between 1962 and 1963 both Ghana and Nigeria replaced the banking ordinances devised by a Bank of England adviser with new banking statutes that enabled them to diversify their holdings away from sterling.[95] In Ghana these new instruments enabled the Bank of Ghana to advance long-term credit to the government and gave the government greater control over it.[96] This was the very opposite of what the Bank of England had hoped, and the experience served as a salutary lesson that overseeing the founding statutes of new banks was no guarantee against unwelcome future developments.

These departures from British models occurred even as Britain's other African colonies were still progressing to independence and advisers adapted their approaches in the light of the West African developments.[97] As we have already seen, a similar trend in relation to new African universities was equally chastening for Margery Perham.[98] As Ian Maxwell later wrote, in these circumstances the IUC could do little more than 'give moral support' or occasionally attempt to bring some pressure to bear via informal channels.[99] Developments in this sector nevertheless led Eric Ashby to reflect on the lessons to be learned if autonomy was to be restored or, in the case of future institutions, ensured. Sir Ivor Jennings offered one insight: speaking in 1948 he noted that Ceylonese experience suggested that – however counterintuitive – the inclusion of representatives of state legislatures on university governing bodies might in fact be the best means of ensuring university autonomy. Others also speculated as to whether the construction of institutions detached from the state in line with a British liberal tradition was not the problem rather than the solution. T.H. Silcock, drawing on his experience of universities in South-East Asia questioned whether the French model in which university staff were civil servants while still having academic freedom might not be better.[100]

More widely, although generalisation across so many countries and sectors is difficult, attempts to replicate the relative autonomy of institutions from the state and thereby to implant a distinctly British model of a politically liberal system, created institutions that

might not only be viewed as 'colonial' but sometimes regarded with suspicion as alternative, and potentially competing, sources of power by governments that demanded political loyalty rather than neutrality. As we have also seen British ambitions to develop institutions on liberal lines were in tension with British self-interest, resulting in in-built distortions and ambiguities that (whether intentionally or not) departed from the British tradition. As Ashby reflected with reference to the derogation from freedom in institutions he had helped develop, 'The patterns we have exported are not in fact the patterns we practise'.[101] Contemporary Britons would probably not all have recognised this, but inevitably, institution building at the end of empire constituted a form of imperial liberalism rather than a liberal imperialism.

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[2] Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World. Essays on Liberalism and Empire*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016), p. 87.

[3] On the transfer of the Westminster model, see Harshan Kumarasingham, *A Political Legacy of the British Empire. Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka*. I.B. Tauris, London, 2013).

[4] Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire. The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2005), Theodore Koditschek, *Liberalism, Imperialism and the Historical Imagination. Nineteenth Century Vision of Greater Britain*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011); Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930*. Stanford University Press, Indiana, 1997).

[5] On the transitions between formal and informal empires, See W.R. Louis and R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 22, no 3. 1994), pp. 462-511; and J.A. Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, 6. 1953), pp. 1-15.

[6] The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London, FO 953/5A, Sir Reginald Coupland, 'The Goal of British Rule in India', attached to minute, 26 Sept. 1947, cited in Sarah Stockwell, 'Britain and decolonization in an era of global change' in Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson eds.

The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire. published online 2017; hardback forthcoming December 2018).

[7] As Cooper argues in relation to development, Frederick Cooper, 'Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and the Development Concept' in F. Cooper and Randall Packard eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997), pp. 64-91. For a nineteenth century Indian comparison see, C.A. Bayly, *Recovering Liberties. Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

[8] Emma Hunter, 'Languages of Freedom in Decolonising Africa', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* sixth series, XXVII. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017), pp. 253-69.

[9] Based on Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, 'Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: A theme with three variations', in Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley eds., *Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony. The Politics of the Legal Complex.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), pp. 3-55, esp. p. 4.

[10] See, e.g., Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt eds., *Development and Colonialism. The Past in the Present.* James Currey/Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge, 2009), esp. Vernon Hewitt, 'Empire, International Development and the Concept of Good Government', pp. 30-44. For an earlier discussion of 'good governance' see Michael Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government.* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967).

[11] Although it attracted more attention in some contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous studies: see, e.g., Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson, John Okumu eds., *Development Administration. The Kenyan Experience*. Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1970) or Richard Symonds, *The British and their Successors. A Study of the Government Services in the New States.* Faber & Faber, London, 1966).

[12] For example, see Apollos O. Nwauwa, *Imperialism, Academe and Nationalism: Britain and University Education for Africans 1860-1960.* Frank Cass, London, 1997), pp. 1-28.

[13] Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, p. 41; Eric Ashby, *Universities. British, Indian, African. A Study in the Ecology of Higher Education.* Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. x.

[14] By R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Weller, 'Westminster Transplanted and Westminster Implanted: Exploring Political Change' in Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller eds., *Westminster Legacies – Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific*. University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2005), p. 3. For a critique see, Harshan Kumarasingham, 'Eastminster – decolonisation and state-building in British Asia' in Harshan Kumarasingham ed., *Constitution- making in Asia Decolonisation and state- building in the aftermath of the British Empire.* Routledge, Abingdon, 2016), p. 6.

[15] Extensively discussed in the 1980s, and on which see especially, Robert Pearce, *The Turning Point in Africa. British Colonial Policy, 1938-1948* (Frank Cass, London, 1982).

[16] See Nwauwa, *Imperialism,* pp. 52-63.

[17] Suke Wolton, *Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War. The Loss of White Prestige* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000); see also doctoral research being undertaken by Naima Maggetti of the University of Geneva.

[18] Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley: *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 391, 13 July 1943, col. 48.

[19] On which see, especially, Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag, The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (Pimlico, London, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged. Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of the Empire* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005); Huw Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012).

[20] Rohit De, 'Emasculating the Executive, The Federal Court and Civil Liberties in Late Colonial India, 1942-44', in Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley eds., *Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony. The Politics of the Legal Complex* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), pp. 59-90, esp. 62.
[21] Halliday and Karpik, 'Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony'.
[22] Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011), p. 377.
[23] Halliday and Karpik, 'Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony'. They offer possible explanations as to why some former British colonies were generally 'liberal-legal orders' (like India) and why others were 'despotic' (like the Sudan, Sri Lanka and Singapore) or 'volatile', oscillating between the two. See also Kumarasingham, 'Eastminster', pp. 23-7.
[24] Hunter, 'Languages of Freedom'.
[25] On the emergence of an African middle class see, esp., P.C. Lloyd ed., *New Elites of Tropical Africa* (Oxford University Press, London, 1966); Michael O. West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class. Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2002); and Henning Melber ed., *The Rise of Africa's Middle Class. Myths, Realities and Critical Engagements* (Zed Books, London, 2016).
[26] Patrick Joyce, *The State of Freedom. A Social History of the British State since 1800* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), pp. 3, 17-24, 188-93.
[27] Robert Anderson, *British Universities. Past and Present* (Hambledon Continuum, London, 2008), pp. 28-30, 114, 189.
[28] Ibid., pp. 114-5.
[29] For my own contribution to this: see Sarah Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and its Clients' in Miguel Banderia Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires. Cases and Comparisons* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 148-177.
[30] The following discussion about higher education and public administration draws on Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp. 30-8, 62-3, 96-109, 122-3.
[31] See, e.g., Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert. Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 2007); Heike Jöns, 'The University of Cambridge Academic Expertise and the British Empire, 1885-1962', in *Environment and Planning* 48, no 1(2016), pp. 94-114.
[32] S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell eds., *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925-1945* (British Documents on the End of Empire, HMSO, London, 1996, 2 volumes), part II, doc. 148, 'Some observations on the development of higher education in the colonies, memo. by Professor H J Channon, Jan 1941, CO 859/45/2, no 1. However, there was a complexity to Channon's views, and Nwauwa argues that he saw the development of colonial universities as the key to colonial reform and a means of strengthening empire: Nwauwa, *Imperialism*, pp, 117-8.
[33] At Fourah Bay (Sierra Leone) established by the Church Missionary Society, the Prince of Wales College at Achimota (Gold Coast/Ghana), the Higher College at Yaba (Nigeria), and Makerere College, Kampala (Uganda) and Gordon Memorial College, Khartoum (Sudan): PP. 1944-45, Cmd., 6647, *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies* (June, 1945), pp. 8-9.
[34] Cited in Roland Oliver, 'Prologue: the two Miss Perhams' in Alison Smith and Mary Bull eds., *Margery Perham and British Rule in Africa* (Frank Cass, London, 1991), pp. 21-27, citation 24.
[35] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*; 'Ashton and Stockwell eds., *Imperial Policy*, part I, 'Introduction', pp. lxxix-lxxx.

[36] Tim Livsey, *Nigeria's University Age: Reframing Decolonisation and Development* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2017), pp. 19-20, 27-36.
[37] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*; PP. 1944-5, Cmd. 6655, *Report of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa* (June, 1945).
[38] Ashby, *Universities*, pp. 268-89.
[39] Currently the subject of doctoral research at King's College London by Dongkyung Shin, and also discussed recently in Livsey, *Nigeria's University Age*. There is one major institutional history, written by a former secretary of the Council: I. C.M. Maxwell, *Universities in Partnership. The Inter-University Council and the Growth of Higher Education in Developing Countries 1946-1970* (Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1980).
[40] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*, p. 6, and esp. pp. 30-4 (chapter VII).
[41] Maxwell, *Universities in Partnership*, Appendix III. Ivor Jennings, *Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth* (Oxford University Press, London, 1957); Nwauwa, *Imperialism*, p. 156.
[42] On Jennings, see Harshan Kumarasingham, *Constitution-Maker - Selected Writings of Sir Ivor Jennings* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015), pp. 1-18.
[43] Bodleian Library, Oxford University Archive (OUA), UR 6/Col/6/1, Sir D. Veale to Sir R. Furse, 25 May 1943. From 1949 Veale served on the IUC first as a representative of Oxford, and subsequently as a co-opted member.
[44] Livsey, *Nigeria's University Age*; Nwauwa, *Imperialism*, p. 157.
[45] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*, pp. 34-7 (chapter VIII).
[46] Bodleian Library, Oxford, Mss Perham 719/5, file on the work of the IUC 1950-69, ff. 1-2, notes on development of universities overseas, undated but probably written in the 1960s. For other testimony see the emphasis placed on autonomy by writers who were themselves participants in the process they discuss, although Ashby acknowledged the limits in practice to freedom: Ashby, *Universities*, pp. 291, 306-343; Maxwell, *Universities in Partnership*, pp. 31-34.
[47] Livsey, *Nigeria's University Age*, p, 48.
[48] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*, pp. 34-7 (chapter VIII).
[49] Nwauwa, *Imperialism*, p. 157.
[50] *Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies*, pp. 34-7 (chapter VIII); Ashby, *Universities*, p. 307.
[51] See Nwauwa, *Imperialism*, pp. 212-18.
[52] Hugh Tinker, 'Structure of the British Imperial Heritage' in Ralph Braibanti and others, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), pp. 23-86, esp. 24.
[53] As shown in Henrika Kuklich, *The Imperial Bureaucrat. The Colonial Administrative Service in the Gold Coast, 1920-1939* (Hoover University Press, Stanford, 1979), p. 145.
[54] Véronique Dimier *Le Gouvernement des Colonies, Regards Croisés Franco-Britannique* (University of Brussels, Brussels, 2004)**;** Véronique Dimier, 'Three Universities and the British Elite: A Science of Colonial Administration in the UK', *Public Administration*, 84, no. 2 (2006), pp. 337-66.
[55] By the 'Devonshire Committee'.
[56] Archives of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, GB 760/939, Minutes of a meeting, 17 June 1942, between representatives from Cambridge including the VC and Sir Ralph Furse. On the British civil service, see Peter Hennessy, *Whitehall* (Secker & Warburg, London, 1989), pp. 7, 74-5, 194-9, 123-5.
[57] Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp. 107-8.
[58] CAB 134/1353, AF 1(59), 'The next ten years in Africa': minutes of Africa (Official) Committee meeting to discuss procedure for study, 14 January 1959, reproduced in Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis eds., *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-*

1964 (British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, Volume 4, The Stationery Office, London, 2000), part I, document 19.

[59] *Department of Technical Cooperation. Report of the Committee on Training for Public Administration in Overseas Countries* (HMSO, 1963).

[60] TNA, CO 1017/770, C(60) 116, 'Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service', Cabinet Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 July 1960.

[61] Bodleian, OUA, UR 6/Col 4/ file 13, COL/CP/789, 'The Future of Overseas Services Courses A and B at Oxford University' [undated, but 1961.

[62] Bodleian, OUA, UR 6/Col 4/file 10, CCS, First and Second Courses Sub-Cttee. Supervisor's Report, 2 Jan. 1950.

[63] Kumarasingham, 'Eastminster'.

[64] Bodleian, OUA, CW1 /2, minutes CCS, 5 Mar. 1957.

[65] Dimier, 'Three Universities'.

[66] E.g., see evidence given to the 1929 Tomlin Royal Commission: R.A. Chapman, *Leadership in the British Civil Service. A Study of Sir Percival Waterfield and the Creation of the Civil Service Selection Board* (Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1984), p. 18.

[67] Thomas Balogh, 'The Apotheosis of the Dilettante. The Establishment of the Mandarins' in Thomas Balogh, Dudley Seers, Roger Opie and Hugh Thomas eds., *Crisis in the Civil Service* (Anthony Blond, London, 1968), pp. 11-51, esp. 12, 16, 27-8. This was first pub. in 1959 in Hugh Thomas ed., *The Establishment* (A. Blond, London, 1959).

[68] It argued that the cult of the generalist 'is obsolete at all levels'. PP. 1967-8, Cmd. 3638, *The Civil Service, Volume 1: Report of the Committee, 1966-68* (HMSO, London 1968), para. 15.

[69] Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp, 130-7.

[70] As the complicated career of one Zambian alumni of the Cambridge course from 1961-2 and a subsequent head of his country's civil service, Valentine Musakanya, exemplifies: Miles Larmer ed., *The Musakanya Papers. The Autobiographical Writings of Valentine Musakanya* (Lembani Trust, Lusaka, 2010), pp. 35-6.

[71] Archive of the Bank of England (BoE), London, G1/202, no 77, Sir M. Norman to Oliver Stanley, 26 Aug. 1943.

[72] Ibid., no 61, Sir M. Norman to Sir George Gater, 4 June 1943; no 63, Gater response, 18 June 1963; no 65, note by R.N. Kershaw addressed to Governor, 'London Currency Boards', 11 June 1943; no 76, Oliver Stanley to Sir M. Norman, 23 Aug. 1943; no 73, Confidential note on colonial currency boards, 19 July 1943.

[73] Ibid., no 61, Sir M Norman to Sir G Gater, 4 June 1943.

[74] Ibid., annotation by Sir M Norman, 27 June 1943, on no 68, 'Colonial Currency Boards', 25 June 1943.

[75] C.U. Uche, 'From Currency Board to Central Banking: the politics of change in Sierra Leone', *African Economic History* 24 (1996), pp.147-58. C.U. Uche, 'Bank of England vs the IBRD: Did the Nigerian Colony Deserve a Central Bank?', *Explorations in Economic* History 34 (1997), pp. 220-41; Catherine Schenk, 'The Origins of a Central Bank in Malaya and the Transition to Independence, 1954-1959', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21, no. 2 (1993), pp. 409-31; S.E. Stockwell, 'Instilling the "Sterling Tradition": decolonization and the creation of a central bank in Ghana', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26, no. 2 (1998), pp. 100-19l.

[76] Uche, 'Bank of England vs the IBRD'.

[77] Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp. 166-86.

[78] On the Bank's changing relationship to the British state see, Forrest Capie, *The Bank of England 1950s to 1979* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); David Kynaston, *Till Time's Last Stand. A History of the Bank of England 1694-2013* (Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2017).

[79] R.S. Sayers, 'Introduction' in R. S. Sayers ed., *Banking in the British Commonwealth* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952), pp. vii-xviii.
[80] S. K. Basu, *Central Banking in the Emerging Countries. A Study of African Experiments* (Asia Publishing House, London, 1967), pp. 71-2, 76, 96-7; Erin E. Jucker-Fleetwood, *Money and Finance in Africa, The Experience of Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the Sudan and Tunisia from the establishment of their central banks until 1962* (George Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp. 58-9.
[81] As I discuss in Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp. 159-64.
[82] Eric Helleiner, 'The Southern side of 'embedded liberalism'. America's unorthodox money doctoring during the early post-1945 years', in Marc Flandreau ed., *Money Doctors. The Experience of International Financial Advising, 1850-2000* (Routledge, Abingdon, 2003), pp. 249-75
[83] BoE, OV 7/36, 'Some reflections on Currency Boards and Central Banks in the Colonial Context', paper by J. Fisher, 23 July 1958.
[84] H.A. Gunasekera, *From Dependent Currency to Central Banking in Ceylon: An Analysis of Monetary Experience, 1825-1957* (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1962), p. 167.
[85] Helleiner, 'Southern side of 'embedded liberalism', p. 253.
[86] P.J. Cain and A.G. *Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2016* (Longman, Harlow, 1st pub., 1993; 3rd edn. 2016), pp. 476-8.
[87] Esp. Catherine Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area. From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 1950s* (Routledge, London, 1994), pp. 22, 417. On the importance of, and changing views towards, sterling's international role see also Catherine Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling. Managing the Retreat of an International Currency 1945-1992* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
[88] Basu, *Central Banking in the Emerging Countries*, pp. 96-7.
[89] BoE, OV 68/5, no 56A, J. B. Loynes to H. L. Jenkyns (Treasury), 18 February 1956.
[90] This paragraph draws on Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, pp.171-90.
[91] BoE, OV 68/7, no 183, personal reflections by P. B. Edgeley, 25 Jan. 1961, addressed to Messrs, Heasman, Watson and Parsons.
[92] A full consideration of the reasons for institutional failure lies beyond the scope of this article and they have been discussed elsewhere including in an extensive near contemporaneous literature on institution-building, notably in relation to the military, as well as in later texts. See, for example, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument* (James Currey, Oxford, 1999).
[93] Ralph Braibanti and others, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966); Halliday, Karpik, Feeley eds., *Fates of Political Liberalism*.
[94] Public Records and Archives Administration Department, Accra, Ghana, ADM 13/1/27, Cabinet Minutes, 9 September 1958, item 6; 16 September 1958, item 2; RG 3/1/622, various papers relating to the civil service; RG 2/4/27, Ohene Odame (Establishment CPP branch) to V.C. Crabbe (CPP headquarters), 27 September 1961.
[95] Jucker-Fleetwood, *Money and Finance*, pp. 58-9; Yusuf Bangura, *Britain and Commonwealth Africa: The Politics of Economic Relations, 1951-75* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983), pp. 99-102.
[96] Basu, *Central Banking*, p. 97.
[97] Stockwell, *British End of the British Empire*, p. 155.
[98] On the different experiences of African universities and their relations to their governments see, Joel D. Barkan, *An African Dilemma. University Students, Development and Politics in*

Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda (Oxford University Press, Nairobi and London, 1975), pp. 21-2.

[100] Ashby, *Institutions*, pp. 337-43; Jennings is quoted on p. 339, and Silcock on p. 341.
[101] Ibid., p. 336.

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